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I AM PLEASED to have this opportunity to present
a monetarist view of demand management with spe-
cial reference to the United States’ experience. I will
attempt to present what appears to me to be, in my
country, a general statement of this view of economic
stabilization. My remarks, however, may not he con-
sistent with every aspect of the views held by all of
those actively engaged on the monetarist side of the
current debate.
This paper first identifies quite generally the major
factors which set the monetarist position apart from
the prevailing view regarding economic stabilization.
Then, there is a summary of the major propositions of
this view of demand management. Following this cbs-
eussion, the United States’ experience of the last two
decades is analyzed.
The General Monetarist View
In the United States, monetarists have stressed the
importance of monetary actions in determining the
course of economic activity. Monetary actions include
such actions of the Federal Reserve System as changes
in the discount rate, changes in commercial hank
reserve requirements, and open market purchases and
saks of Government securities. They also include the
Treasury’s management of its cash position. These are
the basic exogenous variables of monetary manage-
ment, with the major emphasis given to open-market
transactions.
The role assigned to the money stock in the mone-
tarist analysis is not generally understood. The money
stock is most frequently used as an indicator of the
thrust or influence of monetary actions on the econ-
onsv. In the United States, there is a close empirical
relationship between current and lagged changes in
money and changes in nominal GNP. Money is not
necessarily considered a causal factor. It is used, in-
stead, as a summary measure of the influence of
exogenous monetary variables, primarily those con-
trolled by the Federal Reserve, on aggregate demand.
Actions of commercial banks regarding their holdings
of excess reserves and actions of households and busi-
ness firms regarding their holdings of currency, de-
mand deposits, and time deposits are recognized as
influencing movements in the money stock, Never-
theless, it is maintained that the usefulness of money
as an indicator of central bank monetary influences
is not seriously impaired by such actions, because
there is considerable empirical evidence that Federal
Reserve actions dominate movements in the money
stock.
The role assigned to interest rates in this analysis
has also been subject to misunderstanding. Contrary
to general opinion, interest rates are an important
aspect of the monetarist transmission mechanism link-
ing monetary actions to economic activity, but interest
rates are no more important than prices of goods and
services. In many aspects, this transmission mechan-
ism is close to the Tobin view, except that it takes
into consideration many more rates of return and
market prices of goods and services. Monetary actions
of the Federal Reserve are considered a disturbance
which influences the acquisition of financial and real
assets. Rates of return on real and financial assets and
market prices adjust to create a new equilibrium posi-
tion of the economy; therefore, these changes are
considered the main channels of monetary influence
on aggregate demand.
The influence of monetary actions through market
interactions is considered to be widely diffused across
all of the markets for financial assets, real assets, and
services. Consequently, it is contended that the influ-
ence of monetary actions on movements in total de—
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mandl is more important for monetary analysis than
their influence on demands of individual sectors. This
Ts contrary to the more conventional view which first
considers the response of individual sector demands to
monetary actions. Such responses, in turn, are then
summed to give aggregate demand. The monetarist
position is that the allocative effects of monetary
actions have little hearing, if any, on movements in
aggregate demand.
A central monetarist proposition is that the economy
is basically stable-and is not necessarily subject to
wide variations iii output and employment. In other
words, the economy will naturally move along a trend
path of output determined by growth in its productive
potential. Exogenous events such as wars, droughts,
strikes, shifts iii expectations, changes in preferences,
and changes in foreign demand may cause variations
in output around the trend path. Such variations,
however, under most circumstances, will be mild and
of relatively short duration. This basic stability is
brought about by market forces which change rates
of return and prices of goods and services in response
to these exogenous events. It is admitted that markets
are not perfectly competitive and arc subject to man)
rigidities. Such market imperfections, however, do
not greatly impair the stabilizing function of markets;
they mainly result in an inefficient allocation of re-
sources Market imperfections also influence the time
pattern of the response of output and prices to mon-
etary actions.
The basic source of short—run economic instability,
which will be discussed in more detail later, is mon—
etary actions which result in accelerations and dcccl—
erations in the rate of money growth. In the long run,
however, the trend rate of monetary expansion does
not influence output and employment, but only move—
inents in the price level and other nominal variables.
Monetarist View of Demand Management
The monetarist view of the role of monetary and
fiscal actions in demand management makes a clear
distinction between the influence of such actions on
real and nominal economic magnitudes. It also dlif—
Ferentiates between the short—run and the long—run
aspects of monetary and fiscal actions.
Monetary Actions
The major impact of monetary actions is believed
b monetarists to be on long-run movements in nom-
inal economic variables such as nominal GNP, the
general price level, and market interest rates, Long—
run movements in real economic variables such as
output and employment are considered to be little
influenced, if at all, by monetary actions. Trend move-
mnents in real variables are essentially determmed by
growth in such factors as the labor force, natural
resources, capital stock, and technology’.
In the short run, however, actions of the central
bank which change the trendl rate of monetary expan—
sion or produce pronounced variations aroundl a given
trend rate exert an impact on both real andl nominal
variables. The timing and the extent to svhich such real
variables as output and employment arc affected de-
pends on initial conditions at the time of a change
in the rate of monetary expansion. Two major initial
conditions are the level of resource utilization and
the expected rate of inflation. For example, an accel-
eration in the rate of monetary expansion at a time
of a high level of resource utilization will have little
short-run influence on output but a quick influence on
the price level- On the other hand, a reduction in the
rate of monetary expansion will result in slower growth
in real output in the short run, with a faster and
larger response if there is-a high level of inflationary
expectations than if there is a low level.
Fiscal Actions
The mnonetarist view of fiscal actions is that their
main impact is on long—run movements of real output.
Goverumnent spending and taxing programs can
change the rate of growth of potential real output by
altering the composition of actual output An expendi-
ture program which re—allocates resources from cur-
rent consumption (for example, reduced iow income
subsidies) to investment (for example, education)
will tendl to increase the growth rate of potential out-
put. Or, a tax program which encourages private
investment will have -a similar impact on potential
output. Since actual output naturally grows--at the
same rate as potential output in the long run, these
allocative fiscal actions do influence the rate of growth
of actual output.
While a faster rate of growth of potential output
will tend to reduce the inflationary aspect of a given
rate of monetary expansion, this influence is believed
to he relatively minor and slow to develop. The reason
for this is that the allocative affects of the usual
magnitude of such fiscal actions on potential output
are not too large and take time to appear.
In the short run, fiscal actions are believed by mon-
etarists to exert sonic but little lasting influence on
nominal GNP expansion and, therefore, have little
affect on short—run movements of output and employ—
ment. It is argued that Government expenditures
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financed by taxes or borrowing from thd- public tend
to crowd out ox’er a fairly short period of time an
equal amount of prix~tdt expenditures, either by’
interest ratd- and price changes or by credit rationing.
There is somne influence exerted ovd-r the first part of
the adjustmnent pc-nod by a given change in Govern—
mnent expenditures financed in this manner; eonse-
quentlv, an acceleration or deceleration in the rate
of c;o\-cmm-nmnc’rmt spending will exert a short—lived in-
fluence on total demnand. Changes in tax rates, accord-
ing to some monetarists, can influence economic
activity in the short run inasmuch as such changes
alter rates of return on capital ass -ts.
Summary of Views on Demand Management
The inonetarist position on demand management
may he summarized as follows:
1. Demand manageinemmt is mainly the use of ruone—
tary actions to foster an acceptable trend rate of
inflation.
2. Short—run instability’ of outpmmt and employment
can be greatly rednced if monetary actions are
avoided which result in accelerations--and decel-
erations in the rate of money growth.
3. Fiscal actions are not an important aspect of
short-run demand mnanagement, but the alloca-
tive aspect of snch actions can be important for
such other purposes as promoting economic
growth or redistributing wealth.
A Monetarist View of Two Decades of
Demand Management in the United States
In analy’zing the demand management experience
in the United States from the monetarist point of view,
thd- last two decades will be divided into three epi-
sodes involving different trendl rates of gro\vth of
the money’ stock. The experience of each episode will
be presented, and then reasons for the recorded
course of money supply growth will be developed.
Demand Management Experience
The last twenty- y’ears can be divided into three
episodes- aecordmg to trend rates of monetary’ expan-
sion — 1952 to 196~,when money’ grew at a 1.7 per
cent averagc- annual rate; 1962 to 1966, when the
trend rate of mnonetary- growth \vas accelerated to a
3.7 per cent annual rate; and 1966 to the present,
when there was a further acceleration to a 6.1 per
cent annual rate of growth in the money stock
(Chart I).
During the decade ending in 1962, demand mnan-
agement was primarily the Federal Reserve’s rcspon-
sibiiity’. Only one major fiscal action, the income tax
cut of 1954, was undertaken for the purpose of influ-
encing aggregate demand. An examination of the
published minutes of the Federal Open Market Comn-
mittee indicates that several mnonetary actions were
taken for the purpose of promoting economic stability’.
Fromn 1952 to 1962, the United States’ money stock
increased at a 1.7 per cent a~-erageannual rate. There
was, however, considerable short-run variability around
this trend rate, with periods of fairly rapid increase
followed by absolute decrease.
The price level performance, except for a short
burst of inflation in 1956 and 1957, \vas very good,
and such performnanee continued into 1965. The GNP
deflator rose at a trend rate of less than 2 per cent
from 1952 to 1965. Performance of the real sector of
the American economy, however, was far fromn ac-
ceptable as the decade \vas marked by three reces-
sions. Over this ten year period, the unemployment
rate averaged 4.5 per cent. Despite an average unem-
ploy’ment rate of this mnagnitude, however, real output
grew only slightly less rapidly than the 3.5 per cent
estimated growth rate of potential output.
The next episode — 1962 to 1.966 — marked the
emergence of attem~ipts-at” fine tuning” movements in
aggregate demand. Fiscal actions became the mnain
tool of such mnanagement of the economy, while
mnonetary actions, in the Keynesian tradition, were
assigned a purely accommnodative role. Little consid-
cration was given to the possibility’ that monetary
actions could exert any independent influence.
Major fiscal actions undertaken during this perIod
for purposes of stimulating aggregate demand were
the investmnent tax credit audi accelerated deprecia-
tion provisions of the Revenue Act of 1962, the Rev-
enue Act of 1964 which reduced individual and
corporate income tax rates, and the Excise Tax Reduc-
tiomi Act of 1965. Then as inflationary pressures
began to mount late in the period, the Investment
Credit Suspension Act of 1966 was adopted to reduce
growth in aggregate demand. -
Monetary’ actions, in their accomnmodative role,
wc-re expansive. The money’ stock rose at a 3.7 per
cent trend rate fromn mid-1962 to the end of 1966
(Chart I). The rate of monetary expansion was vari-
able over this period. It accelerated to a 6 per cent
rate from April 1.965 to April 1966, and then money
did not grow to the end of 1966.
This episodic marked the beginning of accelerating
inflation in the United States. The GNP deflator rose
at over a 3 per cent annual rate during 1966, comn-
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pared with a rate less than 2 per cent during the
1952-i962 period.
Many have viewed the movements in output and
employment from 1962 to 1966 as very satisfactory.
Output rose rapidly, eliminating the gap between
potential and actual output which had existed in the
early 1960’s. As a result, the unemploymneut rate fell
from 5.5 per cent in 1962 to less than 4 per cent in
1966. These developments have been cited as evi-
dence proving the success of the fiscal, “fine-tuning”
view of demand management.
The last episode — 1966 to the present — is one in
which attempts were made to dampen growth in
aggregate demand so as to curb an accelerating infla-
tion. An overriding consideration, however, was to
accomplish this objective without too great a loss of
output and employment. First, fiscal actions were
used, and then mnonetary actions.
The Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968
imposed a temporary 10 per cent surcharge on in-
dividual and corporate income taxes and restricted
the rate of increase in Federal Governmneut expendi-
tures. Next, the investment tax credit, which had
been restored in early 1967, was repealed. Then as
output grew more slo\vly later in the period and the
unemnploymcnt rate rose, the income tax surcharge
was allowed to phase out.
Monetary actions were of a stop-and-go nature
similar to fiscal actions. At times during the period,
monetary actions were assigned an independent role
in demnand management in contrast to the purely
accommnodative role during the 1962-66 episode. In
addition, greater emphasis was placed on controlling
movements in the mnouey stock, Money grew at a7
per cent annual rate in 1967 and 1968. Then, steps
were taken to curb inflation, and money grew at a
markedly lower 3 per cent rate in 1969. But when
considerable economic slack appeared, the rate of
monetary expansion was acceierated to a 5 per cent
rate in 1970 and to a 10 per cent rate thus far in 1971.
The oven-all trend rate of monetary expansion over
the whole four and one-half year period was about
6 per cent, a marked acceleration from the 3.7 per
cent rate recorded from 1962 to 1966 (Chart I).
The performance of the Amnerican economy since
1966 has been considered highly unsatisfactory. The
results of monetary and fiscal actions since 1966 have
been a recession accompanied by a high rate of infla-
tion. Inflation accelerated to over a 5 per cent annual
rate, and the unemployment rate rose to over 6 per
cent.
The experience of the last two decades demon-
strates the great lack of success of demand manage-
ment in the United States. This is particularly’ evident
in the lQ6O’s when very’ activist stabilization actions
were undertaken. Some cite this experience as dem-
onstrating the inability of traditional monetary and
fiscal actions to promote economic stability-. Id onot
accept such a view. Instead, I contend that the gen-
erally’ accepted economic foundation of demand man-
agemneut is faulty. Basing stabilization actions on this
foundation is a sure formnula for failure.
Reasons for Failure of Stabilization Policies
I attribute the very poor record of United States
economic stabilization efforts to four main factors.
First, and foremost, is lack of understanding of the
independent impact of mnouetary actions, as mneasured
by changes in the money stock, on the course of
economic activity. Second, is the great emphasis given
to guiding the course of real variables — output and
employment — and the little emphasis, except for short
intervals of time, given to controlling inflation. Third,
is the great emphasis given to fiscal actions, espe-
cially in the 1960’s. Fourth, is the use of market inter-
est rates as-an indicator of the influence of monetary
actions on econonuc activity.
Role of Monetary Actions Ignored — According to
the monetanist view, central bank actions which alter
the trend growth rate of the money stock exert an im-
portant long-run influence on nominal GNP and the
price level. Accelerations and decelerations of the
money stock have only an important short-run in-
fluence on output and employmnent. Evidence sup-
porting these two propositions is presented in Charts
I and II.~
The money stock panel (Chart I) indicates three
trend growth rates of mnonetary expansion, which
were set forth in the preceding section. Money grew
at a 1.7 per cent average annual rate from 1/1952 to
111/1962. Money growth then accelerated to a 3.7 per
cent trend rate to IV/1966 and to a 6.1 per cent trend
rate to 11/1971. Total spending (nominal GNP) and
the price level responded to the changes in the trend
rate of monetary expansion as postulated by mone-
tarists. Total spending rose at a 4.9 per cent annual
rate from If1952 to 1/1963 and then rose at a 7,4 per
cent trend rate. The price level (GNP deflator) rose
first at a 1.8 per cent rate, then at a 3.8 pen cent rate,
and since II!1969 at a 5.4 per cent rate. The corporate
~Chartshave been updated from those presented at the con-
ference to include datafor 11/1971.
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Aaa bond rate, another nominal magnitude, also
moved in a manner similar to changes in the trend
growth of money.
Chart II, top panel, presents deviations in the money
stock from its trend growth. These deviations are
expressed as the ratio of the money stock to its trend
value for each quarter. The dashed line at the end
of each episode is the ratio calculated on the basis of
the previous episode’s trend for a few quarters after
a change in the trend. This overlap is used to allow for
the fact that a change in the trend growth of money
is not recognized immediately. The second panel pre-
sents the ratio of actual real CNP to potential real
GNP. The trend growth of potential real GNP, as
indicated on the second panel, has been estimated
by the Council of Economic Advisers. The bottom
panel presents the unemployment rate.
Regardless of the trend rate of monetary growth
(1.7, 3.7, or 6.1 per cent), whenever the ratio of
money to its trend value rose (an acceleration in
money growth), the ratio of actual real GNP to its
potential value rose soon thereafter, and the unem-
ployment rate fell. The opposite happened whenever
the rate of money growth decelerated. Despite smmch
short-run developments and despite different trend
rates of money growth, the unemployment rate aver-
aged about the same from 1952 to 1962, when money
growth was relatively slow, as from 1962 to 1971,
when the trend rate of money growth was much
greater.
The developments summarized in Chart II are
consistent svith the monetarist view that accelerations
and decelerations of monetary expansion exercise a
short-run influence on output and employment, hut
there is little, if any, long-run influence. These influ-
ences were given little consideration in demand man-
agement, particularly during the activist period from
1962 to 1968.
Focus Placed on Output and Employment — An-
other factor accounting forthe poor stabilization record
in the United States is the fact that demand manage-
ment has been primarily focused on producing desired
movements in output and employment. This was true
of monetary actions for the 1950’s and early 1960’s
when some independent monetamy actions were taken,
the period inthe mid-l960’s of finetuning usingplanned
fiscal actions and accommodative monetary actions,
and the active use of monetary actions after 1968.
If the economy responds to monetary actions, as
indicated above, a focus of policy primarily on output
and employment can explain the existence of both
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inflation and high unemployment. In attempting to
promote rapid expansion of real output after mid—
1962, active use of fiscal actions and accommodating
monetary actions resulted in the money stock rising
at an accelerated rate until early 1966. Inflation ac-
celerated, and in response, monetary authorities re—
dmmced drastically the rate of money growth for twd)
quarters. But then when economic slack--appeared in
early 1967, money growth was a11o~~’e~i to accelerate
to a trend rate greater than the previomis one. This
sequence of events happened again in 1969 and 1970,
producing a still higher rate of money growth. In
these latter years, however, monetary actions were
on more of a discretionary basis than earlier.
The end result, thus far, of guiding stabilization
policy on real variables has been higher and higher
trend rates of monetary expansion and greater infla-
tion, Periodically, there have been temporary periods
of monetary restraint to curb inflation, which in turn
have produced slower ommtput growth and rising un-
emnployment. Such developments, in turn, induce
stabilization authorities to initiate a still higher trend
rate of money growth, which leads to further inflation.
Thus, the American economy may be faced with
high rates of inflation withommt achieving economic
stability, unless the main emphasis of policy is shifted
to curbing inflation.
Main Emphasis Given to Fiscal Actions — A third
reason for the poor record of economic stabilization
in the United States is the emphasis given to fiscal
actions, particularly from 1962 to 1968. Until recently,
fiscal actions in the form of Government spending and
taxing programs have been given the main emphasis
in economic stabilization efforts to the virtual exclu-
sion of monetary actions. Such a development was
an outgrowth of conventional economuics which for
the past 25 years has taught that Federal Reserve
actions exercise little independent influence on total
demand for goods and services.
According to this widely accepted view, changes
in the money stock bring about changes in market
interest rates, but total demand is little influenced by
interest rate movements. Consequently, monetary ac-
tions have been thought to he of little use in any
program of economic stabilization. On the other hand,
increased Government expenditures are viewed as
adding directly to total demand and tax reductions
as adding to disposable income which would be used
to purchase goods and services. Consequently, this
view has argued that fiscal actions have an immediate
and powerful influence on total spending. This analy-
sis has received wide acceptance as evidenced in dis-FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS SEPTEMBER 1971
Ratio to Trend
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emissions of economic stabilization by- the general pmmh-
lic, in the press, in the Congress, mmd in the Reports
of the Council of Economic Advisers froni 1962 to
1969.
It is my belief that the accelerating inflation of the
last half of the 1960’s can he attributed, in large part,
to the great emphasis given to fiscal actions aix! the
downgrading of monetary influence. Monetary’ author-
ities did not reduce the rapid rate of monetary’ expan-
sion during a large part of that period becammse there
was a desire to let fiscal actions cmmrl) inflation and a
belief by’ some that only fiscal actions would be effec-
tive. Then, when restrictive fiscal actions were taken
in mid-1968 — the smmrtax and! slower increases in Gov-
ernment spending — many economists, on the basis
of conventional wisdomn, predicted “fiscal over—kill”
by early 1969. In response to such predictions, mone-
tary’ authorities continued even more expansionamy
actions.
Faulty Method of Monetary Management Used —
A fourth reason for the poor stabilization record of
the last 20 years has been due to the fact that the
usmmal mnethod of carrying omit United States uionetary
policy in the 1950’s and 1960’s ivas faulty. Discre-
tionary monetary policy was reinstated in 1951 after
its suspension during World War II and up through
the early part of the Korean War. The pmlm-pose of
the 1951 change was to permit monetary authorities
to fight the inflation of the Korean War. In conducting
its mnonetary policy responsibilities since then, the
Federal Open Market Committee has relied almost
exclusively, until just recently, on measures of money
mnarket conditions as a guide to its operations. I am
sure that most of you are familiar with the view that
falling interest rates indicate expansionary monetary
actions, while restrictive actions are indicated by
rising interest rates.
Such a view was in general agreement with the
conventional wisdom, which holds that monetary ac-
tions work primarily through changes in market inter-
est rates. It also was in agreement with the view that
the Federal Reserve has great ability to “set” mam-ket
interest rates. Recent research and experience, how-
ever, have tended to reject these propositions. For
example, it has been demonstrated that rapid mone-
tary expansion, such as in 1967 amid 1968, stimulates
total spending, fosters inflation, and thereby generates
rapidly growing demand for credit and rising interest
rates, not lower rates.
By using market interest rates to indicate the thrust
of its actions in the l950’s, the Federal Open Market
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Comnmmttcc ficqmmc.ntly mc smstcd thc pac ‘it ii hich
ttcs fcll dining mccc ssmons mc! most duung iccoscix 5
Such tctmons did not altc r thc ticud gmon th of mnomuy
om mfiation but thy pioduccd tccclcrations ‘md de
cclcr itmons is hmch Ic cI to conomnic mustabiliti
I hc n mu thc finc tuning of thc 1960’s thc Com—
mittcc concluded th it dc spmtc vcry m mpid monctiry
grossth rismug mtc mc st i mtc s mndmc it d consmdc r iblc
monctuy icstm nut dmmrmng 1967 md 1968 Louse
quently it is is hclmcvcd hi mn ins that fin thcm stcps
nc cd not hc t mkcn to icclucc thc cxcc ssmve i mte of
mnonetam y gross th In mc tm ospcet mt ms non mpparcnt
th it the tr’idmtmontl iclnnce on simch me isuies of money
mn irket conditions is mam kc t umtc rcst i atcs conti mhmmtcd
to oum prcscnt rnfl itmon mud to inst tbmlmty in the me’ml
scctoi
Thc focus on mn uket mtemcst matc s in conducting
monetary managcmcnt dmumng thc list h’tlf of thc
1960s mlso lcd to highcm tmcnd r mtc s of monc tamv
xpansion m tis o othem is my s Coustm tints on mntcmest
movcmc nts imposcd by public opmnmon mud thc Con
grcss on [‘cdtr ml Resc rvc ictmons c’iusccl in p’ut the
very xp tnsmvc monc tims ictmons during 1967 mud
1968 Follon ing the m ipmcl risc mu mukct intcmcst m ites
dimming thc crc dit crunch of 1966 thc rc ~sis i bclmcf
thit thc extcnt of the irmcic 1St is ms too gic ‘it inctusc
of the dmsloc itmons is luch hid occmmrrc d in thc sivmngs
mud hommsing mnchmstrics lmt orclcr to forcstall fum thc—
dislocitions thcrc is is ii dc.smmc to hold I) ick thc
umaguitmmde of interest rate increases; this led to pas-
sage of the Interest Rate Control Act of 1966. Pres-
ently there is a reluctance to allow rates to rise for
ft mr of chokmng off thc c commomnmc iccox cii Attempts
to hold back interest mate increases at a time of ex-
panding economic activity require great injections of
hank reserves which coutribmmte to a rapid growth in
the money stock. This, in turn, fosters excessive total
demand and! feeds further the fires of inflation.
The focus on market interest rates also helped to
bring about the extremely high rates of monetary
grosvth during 1967 and 1968 as a result of the deci-
sion to fluin~thc cxp tusmomi of thc \ mc tn tin W im mud
rapidly rising ivelfare programs by- borrowing rather
thamm exclusively’ by taxes. During 1967 mimic! 1968, large
Government financings in the security’ markets caused
the Federal Reserve, because of an evc-n—keel policy
of stabilizing money markets at times of Covem-nment
bom-rosviug, to buy large qimantities of Government
securities. As mentioned earlier, there was great imp-
ward pressure on market interest rates from the private
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both private sources and the Government, large injec-
tions of member bank reserves svere required for
even-keeling by the Federal Reserve. These injections
helped to foster rapid growth in the muoney stock.
Conclusions
Now to answer the question posed for this confer-
ence, “Demand Management, Illusion or Reality?”
According to the monetarist viesv, time ansiver is
“reality,” but the essence of such reality is markedly
different than that of the more conventional, activist
view of demand management. Monetary actions
should be directed primarily at fostering an
acceptable rate of inflation; this requires the follosv-
ing of an appropriate trend rate of monetary expan-
sion. With regard to output and employment, mone-
tary actions should be conducted so as not to be a
source of economic instability; this requures the avoid-
ance of periods of marked accelerations and decelera-
tions in the rate of money growth. Thus, I believe
that there are strong economic reasons for the mone-
tary growth rule -and little room for discretionary,
short-ruin monetary management.
The recent American experience demonstrates the
potential of short-run monetamy actions to produce
both inflation and economic instability. For instance,
the 6 per cent trend grosvth of money since 1966,
given the 1.5 per cent trend increase in velocity that
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has occurred since then, is consistent with a 7 to 8
per cent annual rate of increase in nominal GNP. If
potential real output should continue to rise at its
recent 4.3 per cent annual rate, this rate of money
growth implies a trend rate of inflation between 3 and
4 per cent. If velocity, hoivever, should resume its
higher 3.5 per cent average annual rate of increase
recorded front 1952 to 1966, the recent trend rate of
money growth implies a 5 to 6 per cent rate of infla-
tion. The monetary restraint of 1.969, when money
rose at only a 3 per cent rate, produced the recent
recession in the United States, but since this was only
a relatively short-lived deceleration in money growth,
the rate of inflation was little influenced.
Stabilization actions since 1966 have not been con-
ducive to a marked reduction in the rate of inflation.
The United States inflation will not be reduced sub-
stantially until a lower trend rate of money growth
is established; a 3 to 4 per cent rate probably would
he optima!. Since the present high rate of inflation
has been in existence for several years, however, ex-
pectations are for a continued high rate of price
advance. In such a case, a move to less expansionary
monetary actions will result in considerable adjust-
ment costs in terms of slower expansion in output and
employment. Such costs cannot he avoided if the
United States inflation is ever to he contained, and
attempts to avoid them will probably lead to higher
rates of inflation.
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